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 THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON ACCOUNTING CHOICES: 
CAN CULTURAL CONSERVATISM EXPLAIN ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We explore the extent to which cultural conservatism explains accounting conservatism.  Our 
primary measure for accounting conservatism is the magnitude of non-operating accruals, which 
are highly discretionary in nature.  Culture permeates values and attitudes, and thus governs 
many aspects of human behavior.  Hence it is likely to affect managers’ accounting choice 
behaviors.  However, there is surprisingly little evidence on the association between the two 
types of conservatism in the literature.  Using a sample of 800 firms originating from 21 
countries during the nine-year period from 1993 to 2001, we find strong evidence that the 
managers in more conservative cultural environments tend to make more conservative 
accounting choices (e.g., report lower estimates for future cash flows).  We also find some 
empirical support for the idea that culture and legal regime interact as substitutes in explaining 
accounting conservatism.     
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THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON ACCOUNTING CHOICES: 
CAN CULTURAL CONSERVATISM EXPLAIN ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Accounting conservatism has frequently been described as the most ancient and probably the 
most pervasive principle of accounting valuation (Sterling, 1967, p.10).  Earlier studies of factors 
affecting accounting practices identified economic systems, trade ties, whether accounting relates 
to macroeconomics (national policies) or microeconomics (business economics), whether 
accounting is viewed as part of business practice or administration and control, and language (as 
a proxy for culture) (Mueller, 1968; Nair and Frank, 1980; Choi and Mueller, 1984; Nobes, 
1983, 1984).  Studies have also found that the degree of accounting conservatism across 
countries can be in part explained by the legal regime of an economy, which influences the 
demand for accounting information (see for instance, Ball et al. 2000).  However, we note that 
discussions of country-level factors that might influence the level of accounting conservatism are 
still very limited in the literature.   
 
Adler (1997) argues that culture influences values, and Homer and Kahle (1988) document a 
values-attitudes-behavior hierarchy by demonstrating how the internal and external dimensions 
of values influence attitudes, which in turn influence behavior.  The logical extension of this 
argument is that culture generally influences behavior in a particular group of people (e.g. in a 
particular economy).  Accounting choices among alternative methods of reporting can be 
described as discretionary accounting behavior within the accounting subculture of a particular 
economy.  Along these lines, Gray (1988) conjectured that “there should be a close match 
between culture areas and patterns of accounting practices internationally.”   
 
In this study we focus on the particular dimension of cultural conservatism, because of the 
importance of accounting conservatism to the discipline, as highlighted by Gray (1988): 
“Conservatism or prudence in asset measurement and the reporting of profits is perceived as a 
fundamental attitude of accountants the world over.”  Despite the potential association between 
the two, we note that there is little discussion on the role of cultural conservatism on accounting 
conservatism in the literature.  This motivates our investigation.        
 
Our evidence suggests that the managers in more conservative cultural environments tend to 
report lower estimates for future cash flows (e.g., non-operating accruals).  This result is robust 
to previously identified determinants of a firm’s conservative accounting choices such as the 
legal regime of the firm’s country of domicile and debt-to-equity ratio.  Further analysis shows 
that cultural conservatism plays a relatively more important role in managers’ conservative 
accounting choices in code law countries, where accounting is generally known to be less 
conservative, than in common law countries.  By documenting these associations, this study 
contributes to the literature by (1) identifying a country-level determinant of managers’ 
conservative accounting choices; and (2) documenting how cultural conservatism, as a country-
level determinant of accounting conservatism, interacts with a previously documented 
determinant of accounting conservatism (e.g., the legal regime of a firm’s country of domicile).       
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This study is organized as follows.  In the next section, we briefly review prior literature on 
cultural conservatism and accounting conservatism.  In Section III, we describe the background 
of the issue and develop hypotheses.  In Section IV, we describe our sample and research design.  
In Section V, we discuss our results.  We then conclude in Section VI. 
 
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTS AND ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM 
 
Cultural Constructs   
 
Hofstede and Bond (1988) define culture as “the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes the members of one category of people from those of another.  Culture is composed 
of certain values, which shape behavior as well as one’s perception of the world.”  Hofstede’s 
seminal work on culture (1980, 2001) identifies five dimensions of culture, described as “basic 
problem[s] with which all societies have to cope” (2001, p.29). These are briefly recapped here 
for completeness: 
 
1. Power distance, scaled low to high: response to human inequality 
 
2. Uncertainty avoidance, scaled low to high: reaction to an unknown future 
 
3. Individualism versus collectivism: the extent of individual integration into primary groups 
 
4. Masculinity versus femininity: the division of emotional roles along gender lines 
 
5. Short-term versus long-term orientation: focus of people’s efforts between the present and the 
future. 
 
Various values, attitudes and norms associated with the poles of each dimension are summarized 
in Table 1.  Conservatism is explicitly identified only as a norm in a culture with high 
uncertainty avoidance.  Other related values and attitudes include conformity (in high power 
distance cultures); tradition (in low individualist / high collectivist cultures); cooperation (low 
masculinity / high femininity cultures); respect for tradition and protection of face (short-term 
orientation cultures).  Thus Hofstede’s analysis does not directly discuss conservatism as a 
construct1, but indicates that the values commonly associated with it may be found in cultures 
with high power distance and uncertainty avoidance, low individualism and masculinity, and 
short-term orientation. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Schwartz (1994) attempted a different analysis, based on values organized on two basic 
dimensions: openness to change versus conservation, with the opposing value types of autonomy 
versus conservatism; and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement, with the opposing value 
types of egalitarianism and harmony versus hierarchy and mastery.  For the purposes of a study 
                                                 
1 The individualism/collectivism dimension has been the most popularly used as the explanatory variable in 
subsequent research on culture.  This dimension may be used as a summary of his study. Simply, cultures may be 
described as more or less individualist or collectivist.  
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on accounting conservatism, we believe that Schwartz’s dimensions and values are more 
insightful because: (1) conservatism is defined as one pole of the two basic dimensions; and (2) 
the relationship between and among the polar values types point to an inherent tension within 
conservatism.  The dimensions, value types and underlying values are summarized in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The figure shown in Table 2 illustrates that conservatism, although the opposite of mastery and 
autonomy, has no clear, predetermined position to egalitarianism / harmony versus hierarchy / 
mastery.  Conservatism includes the values of national and family security, which may be linked 
to egalitarianism (social justice, world at peace).  It also includes preserving public image, 
obedience, a respect for tradition and elders, which may be linked to hierarchy (power, influence 
and authority).   
 
Accounting Subculture and Prior Accounting Studies Related to Culture 
 
While the word “culture” is often applied to societies as a whole, the term “subculture” is used at 
the organization, profession or family level.  Cultural integration varies among societies, but 
generally subcultures share characteristics with other subcultures within the same society.  The 
same subculture may also share characteristics across societies.  Gray (1988) offered four 
accounting values or dimensions: professionalism versus statutory control in regulation; 
uniformity versus flexibility in accounting practices; conservatism versus optimism in 
measurement practices; and secrecy versus transparency in disclosure practices.  He defined 
conservatism as “a preference for a cautious approach to measurement so as to cope with the 
uncertainty of future events” (p.8).  His analysis of the Hofstede framework resulted in the 
hypothesis that more conservative accounting systems would be linked to cultures ranking higher 
in uncertainty avoidance (as a proxy for risk-aversion) and ranking lower in individualism and 
masculinity.  
 
Early research in comparative accounting produced an awareness of important basic differences 
in accounting practices and development in different countries, which were linked to the 
influence of various environmental factors (e.g., Mueller, 1967; Zeff, 1971; Radebaugh, 1975; 
Choi and Mueller, 1984; Nobes and Parker, 1985).  Mueller (1967) deduced an accounting 
classification system for western nations with market-based economies, based on four different 
approaches to accounting: whether accounting relates to macroeconomics (national policies) or 
microeconomics (business economics), and whether accounting is viewed as part of business 
practice or administration and control.  This approach was extended by Nobes (1983, 1984) to 
include distinctions between tax and legal perspectives at both national and business levels.  
However, these early studies by and large ignored culture as an environmental factor. 
 
Nair and Frank (1980) used an inductive approach to identify existing accounting patterns based 
on analysis of actual accounting practices, distinguishing between measurement and disclosure 
practices.  Five groupings emerged based on measurement practices, largely following the 
“spheres of influence” classifications suggested by Seidler (1967).  The disclosure groupings 
found were dissimilar.  The relationships among the groupings were assessed in terms of 
economic structure, trading ties and language (as a proxy – unexplained - for culture). 
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As Watts (1993) notes, accounting conservatism can be approached from its role in debt 
contracting or in earnings-based compensation schemes, among others.  Accounting 
conservatism in liquidations and bankruptcies situations can be justified on the basis that the firm 
needs to ensure no distribution is made when there is a possibility that a prior contractual claim 
will not be paid.  The contracting demand for a performance measure for managerial evaluation 
and compensation purposes is a demand for an estimate of the effects of management’s actions 
on firm value (Watts 1993).  
 
Recent research conducted in a cross-county setting has contributed in identifying determinants 
of accounting conservatism. Ball et al. (2000) characterize the “shareholder” and “stakeholder” 
corporate governance models of common and code law countries as resolving information 
asymmetry by public disclosure and private communication, and provide evidence consistent 
with the view that code law accounting income is less timely, particularly in incorporating 
economic losses.  Their result basically suggests that accounting income in common law 
countries tends to have more “conservative” properties because of the differences in corporate 
governance structures associated with legal regimes.  Chui et al. (2002) examine whether 
national culture affects corporate capital structures.  They find that firms domiciled in countries 
with more conservative culture have lower corporate debt ratios.  Ahmed et al. (2002) document 
that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating the bondholder-shareholder 
conflicts over dividend policy by reducing the risk to bondholders that the firm will pay 
excessive dividends to shareholders. 
 
In relation to disclosure practices, Jaggi and Low (2000) suggest that managers in more 
individual societies are likely to disclose more because people in more individualistic societies 
tend to be more competitive and less secretive.  Hope (2003) investigates the relative roles of 
legal origin and culture in explaining firm-level disclosure levels and finds that: (1) both legal 
origin and culture are important in explaining firm disclosure; (2) neither of the factors 
dominates with respect to overall explanatory power for variations in disclosure levels; and (3) 
legal origin is an important conditioning variable for the role of culture, suggesting that there is 
an interaction between legal origin and culture in explaining disclosure levels across countries.  
This interaction may also apply in explaining accounting conservatism, although prior research 
(Nair and Frank, 1980) indicates that the accounting values and practices relating to 
measurement and disclosure do not necessarily map one on one. 
 
All said, we note that a study that links these two streams of studies on accounting conservatism 
and culture (cultural conservatism in particular) is missing in the literature.  Given that culture 
permeates human behavior and that managers, as human beings, are also likely to be impacted by 
their cultural environment, the linkage between the two types of conservatism appears to be a 
both interesting and important question that is yet to be addressed.  Our study attempts to fill this 
void.  
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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this study, we follow the full definition of cultural conservatism proposed by Schwartz (1994): 
 
“those values likely to be important in societies based on close-knit 
harmonious relations, in which the interests of the person are not 
viewed as distinct from those of the group.  All of these values 
emphasize maintenance of the status quo, propriety and avoidance 
of actions or inclinations of individuals that might disturb the 
traditional order.  These are socio-centric values, appropriate in 
settings where the self lacks autonomous significance but has 
meaning as part of the collectivity.  Cultures that emphasize 
conservatism are primarily concerned with security, conformity 
and tradition [emphasis added]”. 
 
We build on the three primary characteristics of conservatism identified: (1) security (national 
and family security, social order), (2) conformity (preserving public image, obedience) and (3) 
tradition (honoring elders, respect tradition).  Thus, one would expect that individuals would tend 
to be more security seeking, more concerned about their public image, and show more respect 
for elders/superiors in a more conservative culture. 
 
We follow the definition of accounting conservatism adopted by the FASB (1980), which 
describes conservatism as the choice of the lower estimate of future cash flows when two 
estimates are equally likely.  This definition leads us to the first (simple) supposition that more 
conservative managers will choose to report lower earnings figures and higher provisions 
estimates among alternatives, ceteris paribus.  However, applying the cultural conservatism 
analysis to accounting conservatism suggests that this is not the only possible outcome. 
 
In the accounting subculture, which is often described as “conservative,” we expect individuals 
would tend to be security seeking, concerned about their public image, and show respect for 
elders/superiors.  We also assume that higher earnings estimates / lower provisions estimates 
may not reflect the “true” position, and lead to greater risk of litigation and scandal.  Finally, we 
note that accountant managers may be subordinate to superiors who are possibly non-
accountants, and may have a preferred estimate not necessarily based on the “true” position. 
 
Security-egalitarianism hypothesis – more conservative choices 
 
Making more conservative accounting choices may be explained in terms of security and 
egalitarianism.  Such choices reduce litigation threats in most jurisdictions (security) and may be 
viewed as in the best interests of social justice (egalitarianism).  Therefore, managers who are 
more concerned with his/her security are expected to make more conservative accounting 
choices under this scenario.  Basically, the idea here is that a culturally conservative manager 
with an egalitarian mind will choose to report lower estimates for future cash flows, ceteris 
paribus. 
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Security-tradition-hierarchy hypothesis – less conservative choices 
 
The discussion in section II above have pointed out a possible link between conservatism and 
hierarchy.  That is, a “security-seeking” manager may make a less conservative accounting 
choice if his superior has a preferred choice, and advancement and / or job security is tied to this 
choice.  Thus tradition (respect to elders) and its link to hierarchy might interact with security 
(family / job) to lead to a different outcome.  However, we also note that it is equally possible 
under the security-tradition-hierarchy hypothesis that managers may also choose to report more 
optimistic estimates about future cash flows in order to “please” their superior(s).   
 
Public image-egalitarianism hypothesis – more conservative choices 
 
Under the public image value of cultural conservatism, managers may also choose more 
conservative accounting choices.  Such conservative choices result in higher social justice 
(egalitarianism) and lessen the risk of litigation and scandal, which would ruin their reputation 
(public image).  Thus, we expect that public image-conscious managers with an egalitarian 
mindset will choose to report lower estimates for future cash flows, ceteris paribus. 
 
Public image-tradition-hierarchy hypothesis – less conservative choices 
 
Again, tradition and hierarchy may interact with public image to lead to a different outcome.  For 
example, a conservative manager does not wish to tarnish his reputation from reporting a bad 
firm performance (public image), or from reporting a performance that contradicts his superior’s 
preferences (tradition / hierarchy).  The outcome might be a choice for an upward adjustment to 
earnings to signal his / his superior’s managerial capability to others.  Under this scenario, a 
culturally conservative manager will choose to report higher estimates for future cash flows, 
ceteris paribus.   
Given these varying scenarios, the association between cultural conservatism and accounting 
conservatism is not very obvious ex-ante.2  The presence of such competing hypotheses provides 
an interesting setting for an empirical investigation.  Along these lines, we formulate our first 
hypothesis in the null form as in the following: 
 
H1: There will be no association between cultural conservatism and 
accounting conservatism. 
 
We also note that both cultural and legal factors will influence human behavior and hence 
managers’ conservative accounting choices.  How the two factors will interact in affecting the 
managers’ behaviors, however, is not clear ex-ante.  One possibility is that managers tend to 
choose more conservative accounting choices when both culture and the nature of the legal 
system reinforce their conservative mindset.  Under this scenario, one would expect a positive 
synergy between culture and legal system with regards to explaining managers’ conservative 
accounting choices.   
 
Yet another possibility is that either one of the factors (e.g., culture or legal system) is sufficient 
in determining managers’ conservative accounting choices.  In this case, there would not be 
                                                 
2 Again, a central concept of cultural conservatism is that individual interests are in line with group interests.    
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much synergy between culture and legal system in explaining accounting conservatism, which 
means that the interaction effect between the two explanatory factors will be negligible.  
Following this chain of reasoning, we formulate our second hypothesis as in the following.  It is 
once again stated in the null form since the direction of association is not clear ex-ante.  
 
H2: There will be no interaction effect between culture and legal regime in 
explaining managers’ conservative accounting choices.  
 
 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
We choose non-operating accruals, which are pure accounting variables, rather than other 
market-based measures of conservatism (e.g., see Basu 1997, for instance), as our main surrogate 
for accounting conservatism because the market-based measures are likely to be affected by both 
accounting conservatism and investor conservatism.  That is to say, to the extent that culture 
affects the human behavior, it is more reasonable to view that cultural conservatism will affect 
not only managers’ behaviors but also investors’ behaviors.  Thus, if we use market-based 
measures of conservatism as our main surrogate, it becomes difficult to tell whether the 
conservatism effect is originating from the conservatism in accounting or conservatism in the 
market.  Specifically, using market-based measures of conservatism as a benchmark for 
accounting conservatism (such as in the case of Basu regression 1997 for instance) in our context 
will tell us the relative degrees of conservatism between the market and accounting, rather than 
the degree of accounting conservatism per se, once we posit that the investors are also influenced 
by the cultural environment, which we believe is a more realistic view of cultural influence on 
people.  
 
In this spirit, we use the magnitude of non-operating accrual as our measure of accounting 
conservatism (see for instance, Givoly and Hayn 2000).  The idea here is that given that 
managers have a fair amount of flexibility in reporting non-operating accrual items, they will 
choose to report a lower figure, ceteris paribus, if they are under the influence of more 
conservative cultural environment.3  Specifically, we use the mean of non-operating accruals 
over a period of time (e.g., nine years) as our proxy for accounting conservatism (see Ahmed et 
al. 2002).4  The reversal of accruals means that income and cash flow will converge after a 
period of time and consequently, the mean of accruals over the same time period is expected to 
converge to zero.  Thus, we posit that the lower the non-operating accruals over a given period of 
time, the more conservative the accounting choices are.   
 
Following Dechow (1994), we compute non-operating accruals as in equation (1).  Firm value 
and the predictability of earnings depend on whether earnings are derived primarily from future 
growth opportunities or assets-in-place (Smith and Watts, 1992).  To the extent that the variation 
in growth opportunities among firms may affect the magnitude of accruals, we scale non-
operating accruals by total assets for every firm year observation. 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, we later conduct a sensitivity test using book-to-market ratio as another measure of accounting 
conservatism (see Table 4).  The main result, however, remains unchanged. 
4 We also repeat the analysis using non-operating accruals accumulated over six and seven years.  However, our 
main conclusion is not affected by the length of the accumulation period. 
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 NOA = AA – OA                                                                                       (1)  
where: 
 
NOA = non-operating accruals; 
 
AA = aggregate accruals = earnings5 – net cash flows; 
 
OA = operating accruals = operating income – CFO 
 
CFO = cash from operations = operating income before depreciation and 
amortization – interest – taxes - ∆WC; 
 
∆WC = ∆ working capital = ∆AR + ∆INV + ∆OCA - ∆AP - ∆TP - ∆OCL, 
where ∆ is the change in each variable from period t-1 to t, AR is 
account receivable, INV is inventory, OCA is other current assets, 
AP is accounts payable, TP is tax payable and OCL is other current 
liabilities. 
 
 
We obtain financial data from the Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial database and market 
data from the Compustat Global Issue database, and convert the data from local currency to U.S. 
dollar using Compustat Global Currency.  We extract the required data for all firms contained in 
Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial from 1993 to 2001 and match them to firms contained 
in Compustat Global Issue.  Our sample period start in 1993 because no data prior to 1993 are 
available on the database.  We require the observations in our sample to have all data, as 
specified in our regression model, from 1993 to 2001, leaving a final sample of 800 firm 
observations.  The sample represents firms originating from 21 countries.  Descriptive statistics 
are found in tables 3 and 4. 
 
[Insert Table 3 & 4 about here] 
 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the variables used in our 
regression model.  NOA is our measure of accounting conservatism, and a lower value of NOA 
indicates less accruals, and thus, greater accounting conservatism. With reference to panel A, the 
mean value of NOA for our final sample is 0.035 with a standard deviation of 0.145.  The 
Schwartz score is our measure of cultural conservatism, with a sample mean of 3.817 and a 
standard deviation of 0.408.  The average book-to-market ratio and debt ratio are 0.762 and 
0.587, respectively.  The average firm size (e.g., log of average market value equity) is 2.548. 
 
In Panel B, we present the correlation among NOA, BM (firm-specific average mean book-to-
market ratio during the sample period, which is our alternative measure of accounting 
conservatism), CUL and the other control variables.  We measure BM by dividing the book 
value at the end of period by the market value of equity at fiscal year end.  A priori, we expect 
the correlation between the two proxies for accounting conservatism NOA and BM to be 
                                                 
5 We ran the regressions using both earnings before and after extraordinary items and the results of both regressions 
were similar. 
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positive.  However, the correlation between the two measures of accounting conservatism is not 
significant.6  Panel B shows that NOA and CUL are negatively correlated at the 5% significant 
level, which means that managers from a more culturally conservatism society (a high cultural 
conservative score) will tend to make more conservative accounting choices (lower level of non-
operating accruals).  However, the correlation between BM (our alternative measure of 
accounting conservatism) and CUL is positive and insignificant.   
 
Ball et al. (2000) show that common law accounting income is timelier in incorporating 
economic losses compared to code law accounting income.  Referring to Panel B, there is a 
positive correlation between NOA and CODE, although insignificant.  In contrast, the correlation 
between BM and CODE is negative.  In the presence of legal penalties and arm’s length debt and 
equity markets, we will expect managers in common law countries to report more conservative 
accounting income.  Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest that management of firms facing 
high political costs has incentives to lower reported earnings.  Given that the magnitude of 
political costs is highly dependent on firm size, we will expect large firms to use more 
conservative accounting.  We thus control for firm size by incorporating the natural log of 
average market value of the firm.   
 
We also include debt-to-equity ratio as a control variable in our regression model.  Based on a 
sample of 22 countries, Chui et al. (2002) find that there is a negative correlation between culture 
conservatism and corporate debt ratios.  Specifically, they document that countries with high 
scores on the cultural dimensions of “conservatism” and “mastery” tend to have lower corporate 
debt ratios, after controlling for other known determinants of debt ratios.  Consistent with their 
finding, the correlation coefficient between CUL and DEBTR, as shown in Panel B, is negative.7     
 
On the other hand, Ahmed et al. (2002) argue that conservative accounting reduces the risk to 
bondholders by preventing excessive dividend payments to shareholders.  Intuitively, firms with 
higher debt-to-equity rely more on debt financing than equity financing and thus, managers are 
likely to use conservative accounting to reduce the bondholders’ risk of dividend overpayment 
and in turn, reduce the firm’s cost of debt.  Based on Panel B, the correlation between NOA and 
DEBTR as well as BM and DEBTR is negative.  Further, Table 4 provides a summary of 
statistics by country.  Generally, we observe that countries with NOA figures that are lower than 
the mean NOA of 0.035 have cultural conservatism scores that are higher than the mean score of 
3.817. 
 
 Our main regression model for testing the first hypothesis is as follows:- 
 
NOAi = β0 + β1CUL + β2CODE + β3SIZEI + β4DEBTRi + εi                           (2) 
 
 
                                                 
6 A possible explanation is that book-to-market ratio serves as a proxy for other firm characteristics (e.g. firm 
growth) and thus, may not be an ideal measure of accounting conservatism as frequently been criticized.  
7 However, the effect of debt-to-equity ratio on accounting conservatism is not very clear.  The debt covenant 
hypothesis suggests that managers will report higher earnings to avoid breaching debt covenants.  As it is likely that 
firms with higher debt-to-equity ratios are at greater risk of violating debt covenants, managers may have incentive 
to report higher earnings through the use of accruals.  
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where: 
 
NOA = average of non-operating accruals over the nine-year sample 
period; 
 
CUL = culture conservatism index score taken from Schwartz (1994)8; 
 
CODE = indicator variable that takes the value of zero (one) if the firm’s 
country of domicile if of common (code) law origin; 
 
SIZE = natural log of average market value equity of the firm over the 
nine-year sample period; 
 
DEBTR = average debt-to-equity ratio of the firm over the nine-year sample 
period. 
   
Next, we use the following regression model to test for our second hypothesis.  Specifically, our 
interest here is on coefficient β3, which is expected to be significant if there is any interaction 
between culture and legal regime in explaining the degree of accounting conservatism (as 
measured by the magnitude of non-operating accruals). 
 
NOAi = β0 + β1CUL + β2CODE + β3CUL*CODE + β4SIZEi + β5DEBTRi + εi         (3)    
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The results from estimating the main regression models to test our two hypotheses are found in 
table 5.  Our variable of interest, CUL, has a coefficient estimate of –0.081 with a White’s 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistic of –2.05 (p<0.05, two-tailed).  Basically, this 
result shows that managers from more conservative cultural environments tend to report lower 
non-operating accrual figures, which in turn suggests that those managers have a tendency to 
make more conservative accounting choices.  The model overall has an F-statistic of 11.30, 
which is significant at 1% level, and the adjusted R-squares of the model is 4.66%.  The other 
control variables generally have predicted signs, but only DEBTR is significant (at p<0.01), 
while CODE and SIZE are not significant at any conventional significance level.9   
 
Turning to the results from estimating the next regression model that tests our second hypothesis 
by including the interaction term between CUL and CODE, we find that while CUL remains 
                                                 
8 We note from table 3 that CUL and CODE are highly correlated.  To avoid the effects of multi-collinearity 
affecting our inference, we use an economic procedure of orthogonalizing the two variables.  That is, we regress the 
cultural scores on legal regime dummies and use the predicted residuals from this regression as our measure for 
CUL.  This way, we purge relevant information in cultural conservatism that is already accounted for by legal 
regime. 
9 To control for the effects of industry membership, we repeat the analysis after including industry dummies.  The 
results remain the same.   
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highly significant (at p<0.01) even after the interaction term is introduced, the interaction term is 
not significant with a t-statistic of –0.019.  We interpret the insignificance of the interaction term 
as suggesting that there is little synergy between culture and legal regime (e.g., the two are 
neither complements nor substitutes) in explaining accounting conservatism. 
 
Next, we conduct a set of sensitivity tests to ensure that the conclusions we draw from our main 
regression models are robust to alternative explanations.  In particular, we focus on the 
sensitivity of our results with respect to the use of an alternative surrogate for accounting 
conservatism and to an uneven sample representation of firms originating from different 
countries.  These results are reported in tables 6 and 7.  The first sensitivity test involves 
demonstrating the robustness of our results using an alternative proxy for accounting 
conservatism.  Although, as we have previously pointed out, market-based measures of 
conservatism may not be a clean measure for accounting conservatism, we examine whether 
adopting the book-to-market ratio as a surrogate for accounting conservatism has an impact on 
our inference.  
 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In this spirit, the results reported in table 4 replace non-operating accruals (NOA) with firm-
specific average mean book-to-market ratio during the sample period (BM) as the dependent 
variable.10  We obtain results qualitatively similar to the ones reported in table 3, and find that 
CUL, our variable of interest, continues to have a negative sign and to be significant at 5% level 
or above using a two-tailed test.  Thus, we corroborate our earlier finding that managers’ 
accounting choices tend to be more conservative for firms domiciled in more culturally 
conservative environments.   
 
Similarly, the earlier finding on the association between cultural conservatism and accounting 
conservatism is confirmed in the next column even when the interaction term between culture 
and legal regime is included in the regression model.  CUL continues to have a negative and 
significant (at p<0.01, two-tailed) coefficient with a t-statistic of –3.87.  This time, the 
coefficient on CODE becomes insignificant.  However, the interaction term between CUL and 
CODE becomes positive and significant at 1% level.  The positive significance of the interaction 
term here implies that culture and legal regime act as substitutes in explaining accounting 
conservatism (e.g., accounting becomes more conservative either if the firm originates from a 
conservative culture or from a common law country). 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Next, we note that different countries are represented to differing degrees in the sample (e.g., the 
number of observations differs quite widely across countries).11  Thus, readers may be concerned 
that our results are primarily driven by the firm observations from countries that are more 
                                                 
10 To make this variable comparable with other regression variables, we take the average of book-to-market ratios 
during the sample period on a firm-by-firm basis. 
11 For example, there are only two firms represented from Turkey and Taiwan, where as there are 149 firms 
represented from Germany. 
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represented in the sample.  To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate the main regression models 
using a weighted least squares regression, using the firm’s country of domicile as the weight.  
These results are reported in Table 5.  Basically, the significance of CUL remains unaffected 
(e.g., CUL remains significant at p<0.01 using two-tailed tests), alleviating concerns related to an 
uneven country representation in the sample.12  
 
An interesting observation here is that the interaction term between CUL and CODE, which tests 
our second hypothesis, becomes highly significant (at p<0.01, two-tailed) after giving equal 
weight to firms originating from each country.  Basically, this result suggests that cultural 
conservatism is a relatively more important factor in explaining accounting conservatism in code 
law countries, where accounting is less conservative in general (e.g., have higher non-operating 
accruals and higher book-to-market ratio).  In essence, this finding suggests that accounting 
choices can be conservative if either culture is conservative or the legal system is of common law 
origin.  This in turn means that culture and legal regimes can be largely viewed as substitutes in 
explaining accounting conservatism.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study examines the relation between cultural conservatism and accounting conservatism. 
Throughout the study, we have noted that accounting choices are made by managers who may be 
subordinates to superiors who are possibly non-accountants. Given that these managers are 
exposed to both business and personal risks, the managers from countries with different levels of 
cultural conservatism (that are likely to have different attitudes towards risk) may make different 
accounting choices. 
 
Our empirical evidence shows that managers from more conservative cultural environments tend 
to make more conservative accounting choices, ceteris paribus (e.g., non-operating accruals are 
lower in more conservative cultural environments).  These results lend support to both the 
security-egalitarianism hypothesis and the public image-egalitarian hypothesis, but not to the 
security-tradition-hierarchy hypothesis nor to the public image-tradition-hierarchy hypothesis.  
Taken together, our results suggest that culturally conservative managers with egalitarian values 
tend to choose lower estimates for future cash flows, ceteris paribus. 
 
Further, we observe some interaction between culture and legal system in explaining accounting 
conservatism.  Our results suggest, after controlling for country-representation (e.g., when we 
give equal weight to each country), that culture and legal regime are better viewed as substitutes 
in explaining managers’ conservative accounting choices.  Specifically, our evidence shows that 
cultural conservatism plays a relatively more important role in explaining accounting 
conservatism in code law countries, where accounting is known to be less conservative (relative 
to common law countries), and vice versa.   
 
In concluding, our results are subject to the following caveats.  First, while our evidence 
indicates that there is a positive association between cultural conservatism and accounting 
conservatism (e.g., culturally conservative managers tend to make more conservative accounting 
                                                 
12 To err on the side of caution, we repeat the analysis after deleting countries that have less than five and/or ten 
observations.  However, our conclusion does not change. 
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choices), it is not clear why.  While our results are informative in that they document an 
association between the two types of conservatism, they do not tell us which particular 
dimension of cultural conservatism (e.g., security, public image, or others) is mainly contributing 
to the documented association.  We believe that this aspect of our study opens up an interesting 
avenue for future research, which would be to explore which dimension of cultural conservatism 
can best explain accounting conservatism.     
 
Second, we recognize that our proxy for accounting conservatism possibly reflects managerial 
conservatism as well as GAAP-mandated conservatism, as cross-sectional differences in 
accounting standards may drive the variations in non-operating accruals among countries.   To 
the extent that culture and legal origin may affect a country’s accounting standard, however, we 
do not expect the effects of GAAP-mandated conservatism on our results to be very significant.  
Finally, we note that the generalizeability of our findings might be somewhat limited due to the 
fact that our sample comprises a limited number of firms that are included in Global Vantage.  
14 
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[Table 1] 
Values, Attitudes and Norms per Hofstede’s Model of Culture 
 
 
Dimension Low  High 
Power distance Independence 
Rationalization 
Superiors and subordinates are the 
same 
Equal rights for all 
Consultative leadership 
Openness of information 
Narrow salary range 
White-collar and blue-collar jobs 
equal 
Conformity 
Tradition 
Superior and subordinates are 
different 
Privileges for some 
Authoritative leadership 
Information constrained 
Wide salary range 
White-collar jobs more valued 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Ease, lower stress, less anxiety 
 
Openness to change and innovation 
Willingness to take unknown risks 
Comfortable with ambiguity and 
chaos 
Tolerance of diversity 
Able to influence 
 
Higher stress, anxiety, 
neuroticism 
Conservatism, law and order 
 
Only known risks are taken 
Need for clarity and structure 
 
Xenophobia 
Powerless towards external 
forces 
Individualism (Collectivist) 
Extended families / clans 
“We” consciousness 
Values differ for in-groups and out-
groups 
Emphasis on belonging 
Harmony maintained, confrontation 
avoided 
Traditional society 
(Individualist) 
Self and immediate family 
“I” consciousness 
Values apply to all 
 
Individual initiative  
Speak one’s mind 
 
Modern society 
Masculinity (Feminine) 
Cooperation 
Security 
Group decisions 
Quality of contacts / environment 
(Masculine) 
Challenge and recognition 
Advancement 
Individual decisions 
Ego boosting / wealth 
Time Orientation (Short) 
Quick results expected 
Protection of “face” 
 
Respect for traditions 
Bottom line 
(Long) 
Persistence, perseverance 
Protection of “face” considered 
weak 
Adaptation to circumstances 
Strong market position 
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[Table 2] 
Dimensions of Values per Schwartz’s Model of Culture 
 
 
 
Value type 
 
Harmony Egalitarianis
m 
Conservatis
m 
Hierarchy Mastery Autonomy 
Descriptio
n 
Harmony 
with nature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concern for 
the welfare 
of others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual’s 
significance 
derived 
from 
participation 
in / 
identificatio
n with 
group’s 
shared way 
of life 
 
 
 
Preferred 
degree of 
hierarchic
al 
relations 
in society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mastering 
the 
environme
nt and 
changing 
the world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual 
has 
independe
nt rights 
and 
desires, 
relates to 
others 
through 
negotiation 
 
 
Some 
underlyin
g values 
*protect 
environme
nt 
*unity with 
nature 
*social 
justice 
*freedom 
*equality 
 
*security 
*conformity 
*tradition 
*wealth 
*power 
*authority 
*daring 
*ambitious 
*choose 
own goals 
*exciteme
nt 
*variety 
*pleasure 
 
 
Self-enhancement 
Openness to change 
Autonomy  
Conservatism 
Hierarchy / 
Mastery 
Egalitarianism 
/ Harmony 
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[Table 3] 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics (n=800) 
 
 
 Min Median Max Mean Std Dev 
NOA -3.708 0.041 0.235 0.035 0.145 
BM 0.001 0.619 4.702 0.762 0.580 
CUL 3.250 3.830 4.460 3.817 0.408 
CODE 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.568 0.496 
SIZE 5.461 12.814 21.324 12.925 2.004 
DEBTR 0.049 0.599 3.676 0.587 0.207 
 
 
Panel B:  Correlation Matrix 
 
 NOA BM CUL CODE SIZE DEBTR 
NOA       
BM -0.005      
CUL -0.083** 0.008     
CODE 0.032 -0.059* -0.853***    
SIZE -0.110** -0.367*** -0.117*** 0.172***   
DEBTR -0.121*** -0.051 -0.296*** 0.276*** 0.057  
 
 
 
 
 
NOA refers to the average of non-operating accruals over the nine-year sample period.  BM 
refers to the average of book-to-market ratio over the nine-year sample period.  To mitigate the 
outlier problem, we drop observations that have the BM value of over 5.  CUL is the cultural 
conservatism index score taken from Schwartz (1994).  The higher the score, the more 
conservative the culture is.  CODE is an indicator variable that takes the value of zero (one) if 
the firm’s country of domicile is of common (code) law origin.  SIZE is the natural log of 
average market value equity of the firm during the sample period.  DEBTR is the average of the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the firm during the sample period.  ***, **, and * refer to significance at 1, 
5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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[Table 4] 
Country-Level Statistics 
 
 
Country n NOA BM CUL CODE DEBTR SIZE 
Australia 67 0.039 0.615 4.060 0.000 0.501 12.859 
Brazil 8 -0.451 0.010 3.970 1.000 0.480 19.048 
Chile 46 0.052 1.123 3.250 1.000 0.598 12.813 
Denmark 32 0.044 1.112 3.640 1.000 0.572 12.076 
Finland 21 0.050 0.899 3.840 1.000 0.629 12.969 
France 69 0.038 0.668 3.350 1.000 0.672 13.646 
Germany 149 0.050 0.644 3.420 1.000 0.685 12.692 
Hong Kong 29 0.049 1.325 4.040 0.000 0.406 12.986 
Italy 20 0.028 0.846 3.820 1.000 0.681 12.748 
Japan 22 0.033 0.566 3.870 1.000 0.620 16.214 
Mexico 5 0.067 0.969 4.030 1.000 0.433 13.707 
Malaysia 95 0.007 0.575 4.460 0.000 0.528 12.682 
Netherlands 38 0.073 0.584 3.680 1.000 0.622 13.502 
New Zealand 8 0.065 0.905 3.730 0.000 0.448 12.440 
Portugal 2 0.067 1.459 3.760 1.000 0.318 10.548 
Singapore 52 0.030 0.901 4.380 0.000 0.458 12.345 
Spain 38 0.050 0.598 3.420 1.000 0.596 13.437 
Thailand 54 0.048 1.122 4.220 0.000 0.548 10.742 
Turkey 2 0.012 0.349 4.270 1.000 0.564 13.647 
Taiwan 2 0.059 0.573 4.310 1.000 0.294 11.936 
USA 41 0.025 0.689 3.900 0.000 0.686 14.014 
 
 
 
 
 
n refers to the number of firms.  NOA refers to the average of non-operating accruals over the 
nine-year sample period.  BM refers to the average of book-to-market ratio over the nine-year 
sample period.  To mitigate the outlier problem, we drop observations that have the BM value of 
over 5.  CUL is the cultural conservatism index score taken from Schwartz (1994).  The higher 
the score, the more conservative the culture is.  CODE is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of zero (one) if the firm’s country of domicile is of common (code) law origin.  SIZE is the 
natural log of average market value equity of the firm during the sample period.  DEBTR is the 
average of the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm during the sample period. 
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[Table 5] 
Tests of the Main Hypotheses Using Pooled OLS Regressions 
(The Dependent Variable is NOA) 
 
 
 Test of H1 
(n=800) 
Test of H2 
(n=800) 
Regression 
Variable 
Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept (?) 
 
0.186 
(1.79)*** 
(?) 
 
0.184 
(1.88)*** 
CUL (?) 
 
-0.081 
(-2.05)** 
(?) 
 
-0.072 
(-3.82)*** 
CODE (+) 
 
0.027 
(3.77)*** 
(+) 
 
0.027 
(3.65)*** 
CUL*CODE 
 
  (?) -0.015 
(-0.28) 
SIZE (-) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.84) 
(-) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.87) 
DEBTR (-) 
 
-0.108 
(-2.71)*** 
(-) 
 
-0.108 
(-2.74)*** 
F-Stat.  11.30***  8.97*** 
Adj. R-sq.  4.66  4.67 
 
 
 
 
 
NOA refers to the average of non-operating accruals over the nine-year sample period.  CUL is 
the cultural conservatism index score taken from Schwartz (1994).  The higher the score, the 
more conservative the culture is.  CODE is an indicator variable that takes the value of zero (one) 
if the firm’s country of domicile is of common (code) law origin.  SIZE is the natural log of 
average market value equity of the firm during the sample period.  DEBTR is the average of the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the firm during the sample period.  White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard error estimates are used to compute the t-statistics.  ***, **, and * refer to 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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[Table 6] 
Sensitivity Tests of the Main Hypotheses Using Pooled OLS Regressions  
(The Dependent Variable is BM) 
 
 
 Test of H1 
(n=784) 
Test of H2 
(n=784) 
Regression 
Variable 
Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept (?) 
 
2.187 
(16.63)*** 
(?) 
 
2.248 
(16.58)*** 
CUL (?) 
 
-0.172 
(-2.03)** 
(?) 
 
-0.431 
(-3.87)*** 
CODE (+) 
 
0.023 
(0.56) 
(+) 
 
0.027 
(0.65) 
CUL*CODE 
 
  (?) 0.468 
(2.78)*** 
SIZE (-) 
 
-0.106 
(-10.39)*** 
(-) 
 
-0.112 
(-10.64)*** 
DEBTR (-) 
 
-0.099 
(-0.77) 
(-) 
 
-0.091 
(-0.72) 
F-Stat.  34.98***  28.71*** 
Adj. R-sq.  13.92  14.62 
 
 
 
 
 
NOA refers to the average of non-operating accruals over the nine-year sample period.  BM 
refers to the average of book-to-market ratio over the nine-year sample period.  To mitigate the 
outlier problem, we drop observations that have the BM value of over 5.  CUL is the cultural 
conservatism index score taken from Schwartz (1994).  The higher the score, the more 
conservative the culture is.  CODE is an indicator variable that takes the value of zero (one) if 
the firm’s country of domicile is of common (code) law origin.  SIZE is the natural log of 
average market value equity of the firm during the sample period.  DEBTR is the average of the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the firm during the sample period.  White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard error estimates are used to compute the t-statistics.  ***, **, and * refer to 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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[Table 7] 
Weighted Least Squares Estimation of the Main Hypotheses 
(The Dependent Variable is either NOA or BM) 
 
 
 When the Dependent Variable is 
NOA (n=800) 
When the Dependent Variable is 
BM (n=784) 
Regression 
Variable 
Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept (?) 
 
0.123 
(18.51)*** 
(?) 
 
2.449 
(19.17)*** 
CUL (?) 
 
-0.069 
(-12.42)*** 
(?) 
 
-0.488 
(-4.65)*** 
CODE (+) 
 
0.033 
(16.41)*** 
(+) 
 
0.558 
(3.48)*** 
CUL*CODE 
 
(?) 0.029 
(3.50)*** 
(?) 0.558 
(3.48)*** 
SIZE (-) 
 
-0.001 
(-2.11)** 
(-) 
 
-0.124 
(-12.81)*** 
DEBTR (-) 
 
-0.148 
(-34.32)*** 
(-) 
 
-0.114 
(-1.38) 
F-Stat.  26.84***  37.61*** 
Adj. R-sq.  15.26  18.95 
 
 
 
 
 
BM refers to the average of book-to-market ratio over the nine-year sample period.  To mitigate 
the outlier problem, we drop observations that have the BM value of over 5.  CUL is the cultural 
conservatism index score taken from Schwartz (1994).  The higher the score, the more 
conservative the culture is.  CODE is an indicator variable that takes the value of zero (one) if 
the firm’s country of domicile is of common (code) law origin.  SIZE is the natural log of 
average market value equity of the firm during the sample period.  DEBTR is the average of the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the firm during the sample period.  White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard error estimates are used to compute the t-statistics.  ***, **, and * refer to 
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed).  
